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Management of the Mind. xii + 335 pp., bibl., index. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2013. $24.95; $16.95 (paper).
Combine the current journalistic enthusiasm for everything neurological with the 
nineteenth-century history of speculation about the neural basis of Anglo/Teutonic 
genius, add a pinch of psychopharmacological triumphalism and a dash of venture 
capitalist hype, and you might end up with a big, soft target for critique. 
Fortunately, Nikolas Rose and Joelle M. Abi-Rached’s scintillating overview of 
discourses with the prefix ‘neuro-‘ charts a different course. They have attempted a 
‘more affirmative relation to the new sciences of brain and mind’ (2), eschewing the
caricature of neuroscience as reductionist and simplistic. The result is a critique that
is all the more effective for being sympathetic. Free of the need to hammer home 
the epistemic vices of their protagonists and generous in its acknowledgement of 
neuroscientists’ increasingly sophisticated self-criticism, the book is impressively 
devastating when it comes to the indubitably problematic aspects of these new 
fields.
At the heart of their account stand four recent developments. First is the irresistible 
rise of neuropharmacology, a development that Nikolas Rose has charted in a series
of brilliant previous works, showing how an over-simplified picture of brain 
chemistry ‘enabled the growth of novel transactions between the laboratory, clinic, 
commerce and everyday life’ (10). Second, in the 1990s, the neurochemical brain 
joined forces with genomics to give us a raft of probabilistic assessments of 
susceptibility to mental and behavioral disorders. Third – against the fatalistic grain 
of neurogenomics – comes a preoccupation with neuroplasticity, in which studies of 
epigenetic mechanisms promises to reveal the ways in which experience shapes the
developing brain at a sub-molecular level. Finally, and most ubiquitous, is the 
proliferation of images of the brain in action, made possible through the 
technologies of PET and fMRI scanning.  
The first four chapters range over a wide territory, from the interdisciplinary 
formation of ‘the neurosciences’ in the 1960s, to the vicissitudes of psychiatric 
diagnosis. The book is dazzling in its scope and concision, but there is some 
unevenness of treatment: topics already well-covered by historians, such as model 
organisms, trail long chronologies, while others are treated only within the context 
of the more recent past. Chapters five, six and seven seem to constitute a more 
pointed and coherent argument, covering the ‘social brain’, the ‘anti-social brain’ 
and ‘personhood’ respectively. The choice of the field of ‘social neuroscience’ as a 
focus of enquiry is inspired, allowing the authors to track how the border between 
Geistes- and Naturwissenschaften is currently being renegotiated by the new 
sciences of the human mind. As always, their even-handedness allows them to pack
a mighty punch when necessary: in the chapter on the anti-social brain, for 
example, they suggest that one paper on the neurology of aggression would have 
‘most human scientists and many neurobiologists … reeling at the bizarre jumps of 
logic …’ (185). 
Of all the book’s digs at the excesses of our neurobiological age, the best may be its
coining of the word ‘Libetism’, referring to the abundant philosophical hay made 
from Benjamin Libet’s 1983 experiments purportedly showing that free will is an 
illusion. Characterizing as ‘absurd’ the idea that Libet’s experiment could tell us 
‘anything about the exercise of human will in any of the naturally occurring 
situations where individuals believe they have made a conscious choice’, the 
authors suggest, hilariously, that Libet must ‘be a strange kind of dualist …’ (211). 
Rather than lingering on this dismissive note, however, their demolition of Libetism 
segues into a fascinating catalog of ways that neuroscientists have attempted to 
put back together again the shattered Humpty-Dumpty of neurobiologically 
decomposed personhood. Rose and Abi-Rached gently propose that fMRI studies of 
‘selfhood’ are not the most rigorous of experiments, but that the very plurality and 
imprecision of these gropings suggest all kinds of possibilities for constructive 
engagement between social scientific and neurobiological accounts. In its self-
confidence, eloquence, subtlety, and intellectual generosity, this book is a powerful 
demonstration of its own message: that the human and social sciences have 
‘nothing to fear in the rise to prominence of neurobiological attempts to understand 
and account for human behavior’ (232).
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